150 Filmmakers Ask Canon & Nikon to Sell Encrypted Cameras

[Canon Rumors]

<strong>From Wired:</strong></p>
<blockquote><p><span class="lede" tabindex="-1">IN THE SUMMER </span>of 2013, when documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras was shooting a still-secret NSA leaker named Edward Snowden in a Hong Kong hotel room, she took security seriously. She’d periodically transfer her footage to encrypted hard drives, and would later go so far as to destroy the SD cards onto which her camera recorded. But as she watched Snowden through her lens, she was haunted by the possibility that security agents might barge through the door at any moment to seize her camera. And the memory card inside of it remained dangerously unencrypted, full of unedited confessions of a whistleblower who hadn’t yet gotten his secrets out to the world.</p>
<p>“When you’re in the field filming and your camera is taken by authorities, that footage is completely vulnerable,” Poitras says. “That’s where encryption is really needed.” <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/12/200-filmmakers-ask-nikon-canon-sell-encrypted-cameras/">Read the entire article</a></p></blockquote>
<p>This is something I’ve never personally thought of, but seems to be something that should be taken seriously.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://freedom.press/news/over-150-filmmakers-and-photojournalists-call-major-camera-manufacturers-build-encryption-their-cameras/">list of filmmakers</a> can be seen in the open letter written to Canon at the Freedom of the Press Foundation website.</p>
<blockquote><p>As filmmakers and photojournalists who value our own safety and the safety of our sources and subjects, we would seek out and buy cameras that come with built-in encryption. Adding these data security features to your product line would give your company a significant competitive advantage over other camera manufacturers, none of whom currently offer this feature.</p></blockquote>
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[Ozarker]

I agree with Poitras.

 

[NancyP]

This makes sense, as does automatic upload to a server, as I gather is already done for sports photos and other news photos. If it is not in a copy off-site, it doesn't exist.

 

[Ozarker]

Sony must already have encryption. : : :

 

[unfocused]

On the surface, this sounds good, but the same encryption to protect these filmmakers would also protect child pornographers.

 

[bvukich]

On the surface, this sounds good, but the same encryption to protect these filmmakers would also protect child pornographers.

The argument that I may not have something because someone else may abuse it, is not a valid one.

 

[NancyP]

Encryption with real-time duplication of files off-site is the way to go.
Re: child pornography. Perps are in it for the money and sick kicks, and have no "product" if they can't distribute it to a paying or trading customer. Users are not necessarily going to decrypt - encrypt every time they view the file. That's where you can get useful information leading to the film-maker perp - on the customer's computer.

 

[Valvebounce]

Hi bvukich.
Although in theory you should be correct, it is very much a fact that you are not and there are unfortunately many instances of this mentality prevailing, more is the pity.

Cheers, Graham.

On the surface, this sounds good, but the same encryption to protect these filmmakers would also protect child pornographers.

The argument that I may not have something because someone else may abuse it, is not a valid one.

 

[IglooEater]

On the surface, this sounds good, but the same encryption to protect these filmmakers would also protect child pornographers.

Baseball bats have often been used to kill people- they should be taken off the market and illegalized.

I don't mean in anyway to diminish the wickedness of child abuse in every form, but the problem is not a technological one.

 

[rfdesigner]

On the surface, this sounds good, but the same encryption to protect these filmmakers would also protect child pornographers.

non-isue.

How many peodophiles are caught red handed with the footage as they're shooting?

yes, secure writing to card ought to be a feature, even if only on the 1DXII. presumably that would mean you can't play it back on camera but can only see live images.

The real problem is going to be ensuring the encription is sufficent, what's the chances a "good enough" policy is taken which turns out not to be good enough.

 

[gmrza]

non-isue.

How many peodophiles are caught red handed with the footage as they're shooting?

yes, secure writing to card ought to be a feature, even if only on the 1DXII. presumably that would mean you can't play it back on camera but can only see live images.

The real problem is going to be ensuring the encription is sufficent, what's the chances a "good enough" policy is taken which turns out not to be good enough.

Firstly, as you point out, any technology can be abused. In fact, to get to the root of the problem, with pedophiles, we should just ban cameras!

More seriously: it is a difficult technical challenge to implement encryption on cameras for a variety of reasons:

• It is not practical to have to enter a password every time you want to use the camera, and having things happen like locking the camera after a time-out
• You need encryption hardware which is powerful enough to encrypt HD video, and you will need additional battery capacity
• How do you deal with the issue of getting a camera confiscated when it is switched on, but not locked.

On the brighter side, the typical use cases of a camera make it possible to use public/private key encryption, such that only a public key, which is used to encrypt media is loaded onto the camera. Decryption would require the use of a private key, which is never loaded onto the camera. The private key would only be stored on the computer which is used to process the video. The private key can still be password protected. This would mean that a film maker could go do work in a risky area and shoot. It would not be possible to decrypt the media until returning back to the computer which houses the private key. For instance, if your camera was confiscated in airport security or customs it would be impossible for you to decrypt the media on your camera. - The only key you have with you (on the camera) is the key required to encrypt, but no ability to decrypt.
There is still the issue that authorities will not understand that "rubber hose cryptography" will not work.

 

[RunAndGun]

More seriously: it is a difficult technical challenge to implement encryption on cameras for a variety of reasons:

• It is not practical to have to enter a password every time you want to use the camera, and having things happen like locking the camera after a time-out
• You need encryption hardware which is powerful enough to encrypt HD video, and you will need additional battery capacity
• How do you deal with the issue of getting a camera confiscated when it is switched on, but not locked.

On the brighter side, the typical use cases of a camera make it possible to use public/private key encryption, such that only a public key, which is used to encrypt media is loaded onto the camera. Decryption would require the use of a private key, which is never loaded onto the camera. The private key would only be stored on the computer which is used to process the video. The private key can still be password protected. This would mean that a film maker could go do work in a risky area and shoot. It would not be possible to decrypt the media until returning back to the computer which houses the private key. For instance, if your camera was confiscated in airport security or customs it would be impossible for you to decrypt the media on your camera. - The only key you have with you (on the camera) is the key required to encrypt, but no ability to decrypt.
There is still the issue that authorities will not understand that "rubber hose cryptography" will not work.

While I'm not an engineer, points 1 & 3 seem simple enough.

1) The system is designed with the option that the camera can always works "normally" from a shooting perspective(turn it on and shoot like we always do), but recording is encrypted automatically with no user intervention.
3) The system is designed with the option that playback is never allowed in-camera which would cover the concern of the camera being confiscated while it's on or being used.

 

[IglooEater]

More seriously: it is a difficult technical challenge to implement encryption on cameras for a variety of reasons:

• It is not practical to have to enter a password every time you want to use the camera, and having things happen like locking the camera after a time-out
• You need encryption hardware which is powerful enough to encrypt HD video, and you will need additional battery capacity
• How do you deal with the issue of getting a camera confiscated when it is switched on, but not locked.

On the brighter side, the typical use cases of a camera make it possible to use public/private key encryption, such that only a public key, which is used to encrypt media is loaded onto the camera. Decryption would require the use of a private key, which is never loaded onto the camera. The private key would only be stored on the computer which is used to process the video. The private key can still be password protected. This would mean that a film maker could go do work in a risky area and shoot. It would not be possible to decrypt the media until returning back to the computer which houses the private key. For instance, if your camera was confiscated in airport security or customs it would be impossible for you to decrypt the media on your camera. - The only key you have with you (on the camera) is the key required to encrypt, but no ability to decrypt.
There is still the issue that authorities will not understand that "rubber hose cryptography" will not work.

While I'm not an engineer, points 1 & 3 seem simple enough.

1) The system is designed with the option that the camera can always works "normally" from a shooting perspective(turn it on and shoot like we always do), but recording is encrypted automatically with no user intervention.
3) The system is designed with the option that playback is never allowed in-camera which would cover the concern of the camera being confiscated while it's on or being used.

Yup, basically a camera that can encrypt but cannot decrypt it's own encrypted footage. Everything's as safe as the private key at home. No playback would require somewhat more rigorous technique and note keeping, like in the days of film.

 

[davidj]

This sounds like a business opportunity for Atomos or Blackmagic or another manufacturer of external video recorders.

 

[Antono Refa]

non-isue.

How many peodophiles are caught red handed with the footage as they're shooting?

yes, secure writing to card ought to be a feature, even if only on the 1DXII. presumably that would mean you can't play it back on camera but can only see live images.

The real problem is going to be ensuring the encription is sufficent, what's the chances a "good enough" policy is taken which turns out not to be good enough.

Firstly, as you point out, any technology can be abused. In fact, to get to the root of the problem, with pedophiles, we should just ban cameras!

More seriously: it is a difficult technical challenge to implement encryption on cameras for a variety of reasons:

• It is not practical to have to enter a password every time you want to use the camera, and having things happen like locking the camera after a time-out
• You need encryption hardware which is powerful enough to encrypt HD video, and you will need additional battery capacity
• How do you deal with the issue of getting a camera confiscated when it is switched on, but not locked.

On the brighter side, the typical use cases of a camera make it possible to use public/private key encryption, such that only a public key, which is used to encrypt media is loaded onto the camera. Decryption would require the use of a private key, which is never loaded onto the camera. The private key would only be stored on the computer which is used to process the video. The private key can still be password protected. This would mean that a film maker could go do work in a risky area and shoot. It would not be possible to decrypt the media until returning back to the computer which houses the private key. For instance, if your camera was confiscated in airport security or customs it would be impossible for you to decrypt the media on your camera. - The only key you have with you (on the camera) is the key required to encrypt, but no ability to decrypt.
There is still the issue that authorities will not understand that "rubber hose cryptography" will not work.

AFAIK, some encryption algorithms were designed to be implemented by ASIC, e.g. DES and AES, which would required about as much hardware & power as JPEG compression.

Public key cryptography will have the advantage of not keeping the decryption key in the camera, but AFAIK at higher hardware & power requirements. It might be simpler to implement a switch that cuts the power to the camera.

 

[Hillsilly]

I use bitlocker (and previously truecrypt) on my computers. But anyone who follows this topic would know that there is always doubt about backdoors and special access for government agencies. I think the desire for an encrypted camera is worthy, but whether the camera makers would make a fully secure one is debatable.

Oh, and if such a camera came into existence, don't be fooled by an eventual Canon vs FBI court case. This is just psy-ops to make the less gullible feel that their device is secure. They're not.

I can imagine such a feature would be of use to people wanting to keep personal footage away from pickpockets and thieves. The movie "European Vacation" comes to mind.

 

[Hesbehindyou]

Hmmmm, on the one hand Canon does listen to professionals... on the other hand this is a niche feature that a simple cost-benefit analysis will say don't even try it - they'll have seen from the Apple vs FBI case that it'll inevitably cost them millions in legal fees in the USA (only to find that it can be got around anyway) and of course China will just say 'No' to those models anyway.

TL;DR Potential evenue generated - negligible. Potential problems generated - significant. Canon not interested.

 

[c.d.embrey]

Three things.

1. Encryption can be set-up like Art Filters. No-one can force you to use them.

2. Passwork protection is getting to the point that even the NSA can't brute-force them.

3. Child pornography, as a thing, didn't exist before the mid 1970s. In many major cities, world wide, you could buy it at news-stands. Today many of the producers are teen girls, making risqué selfies.

 

[uri.raz]

Hmmmm, on the one hand Canon does listen to professionals... on the other hand this is a niche feature that a simple cost-benefit analysis will say don't even try it - they'll have seen from the Apple vs FBI case that it'll inevitably cost them millions in legal fees in the USA (only to find that it can be got around anyway) and of course China will just say 'No' to those models anyway.

TL;DR Potential revenue generated - negligible. Potential problems generated - significant. Canon not interested.

IMHO, the analogy doesn't hold. I'll break it into two scenarios:

1. Recovering password from the camera RAM: Canon would provide an external power source with a kill switch on the cable. Someone breaks in? Press the button, the camera is turned off, end of story.

2. Cracking recorded contents: the FBI can't forbid a Japanese company from implementing good crypto. Photographers could re-encrypt the data during the offloading process, the any backdoor would expose data for a short while, so its hardly worth the FBI's effort to get one.

 

[Hillsilly]

2. Passwork protection is getting to the point that even the NSA can't brute-force them.

Assuming they haven't got their quantum computer working yet.